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I regret that I cannot concur but shall not dissent.
-Justice Sanford1

When a federal appellate court decided last year that two reporters must
either reveal their confidential sources to a grand jury or face jail time, the
court did not hesitate in relying on the majority opinion in the Supreme
2
v. Hayes.

Court's sole comment on the reporter's privilege-Branzburg

"The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without
doubt, that is the end of the matter," Judge Sentelle wrote for the three-judge
3
panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
By this declaration, the court dismissed with a wave of its judicial hand
the arguments made by the reporters and media arnici that the court should
follow the more lenient concurring opinion of the fifth justice in Branzburg,
Justice Powell, rather than the restrictive opinion of the Court authored by
Justice White. The reporters had contended that while Justice White's opin
ion rejected any constitutional privilege in this situation, Justice Powell's
concurrence advocated a case-by-case balancing approach and thus left an
opening for a constitutionally based privilege. Because it provided the cru
cial fifth vote in the case and was the "least common denominator" between
the views of the majority and the dissenters, Justice Powell's opinion should
4

control, the reporters had submitted.

*
Hugo Black Faculty Fellow, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A. 1993, University of Iowa; J.D. 1998, University of Chicago. -Ed. I would like to thank Jack Goldsmith,
Elizabeth Garrett, Alfred Brophy, Daniel Filler, George Geis, John Neiman, and Pratik Shah for

their helpful comments and guidance. I am further thankful for the generous support of Dean Ken
neth Randall and the University of Alabama School of Law.
1.
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Schol
arship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1267, 1342--43 (2001) (providing

Sanford's quote).
2.

408 U.S. 665 (1972).

3.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

4.

Id. at 971.
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The reporters' argument was certainly not a new one; numerous courts
and commentators had interpreted Branzburg in the same manner. The
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals all have pro
5
And Justice

nounced Justice White's opinion to be a mere "plurality."

Stewart, the chief dissenter in Branzburg, later declared that the case was
6
decided by "a vote of four and a half to four and a half." Some courts and
commentators, moreover, have concluded that Branzburg was a five to four
victory for the press, with Justice Powell's concurrence plus the four dis
senters actually creating a qualified reporter's privilege-the exact holding
7
Justice White's opinion rejected. As Professor Rodney Smolla surmised,
"[t]he important point of the story [was] that a short concurring opinion by a
Justice who actually joined the opinion of the Court in Branzburg in effect
superseded the majority opinion and became the prevailing law of the
8

land."

The D.C. Circuit, however, would have none of it.Writing with an air of
perplexity in response to the reporters' argument, the panel easily dismissed
Justice Powell's concurrence as mere surplusage:
Justice White's opinion is not a plurality opinion of four justices joined by
a separate Justice Powell to create a majority, it is the opinion of the major
ity of the Court. As such it is authoritative precedent. It says what it says. It
rejects the privilege asserted by appellants.... In any event, whatever Jus

tice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority.

9

5. See In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 990 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985) (referring
to Branzburg opinion as a "plurality"); United States v. Model Magazine Distribs., Inc. (In re Grand
Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum), 955 F.2d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v.
Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir.
1975) (stating that Justice White "wrote for four justices" and referring to opinion as a "plurality").
6.

Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975).

7.

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that
Branzburg recognized some form of a qualified First Amendment reporter's privilege); Shoen v.

Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Branzburg "as establishing such a
qualified privilege for journalists"); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987)
(interpreting Branzburg as recognizing "a qualified privilege"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Rid
enhour, 520 So. 2d 372, 374-75 (La. 1988) (finding that " [t]he vast majority of courts . .. have
proceeded to adopt the dissent's qualified privilege"); 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH w.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 5426, at 745-47 (1980) ("So complete was the
denigration of White's opinion that five years after it was written, a federal court could say that the
existence of the First Amendment 'privilege is no longer in doubt.' ") (footnote omitted). Judge
Posner also has pondered the confusion:
Since the [four] dissenting Justices would have gone further than Justice Powell in recognition
of the reporter's privilege, and preferred his position to that of the majority opinion ... maybe
his opinion should be taken to state the view of the majority of the Justices-though this is un
certain, because Justice Powell purported to join Justice White's "majority" opinion.
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003).
8.
Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and liability for
Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1115-16 (2002).
9. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397F.3d 964, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Scarce, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
Justice White's opinion "is not a plurality opinion"); Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand

August 2006]

Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion

1953

Scanning the D.C. Circuit's decision on my way to teach Branzburg to
my Media Law Seminar, I was surprised by the panel's surety that White's
opinion should be treated as a true majority. What exactly made the D.C.
Circuit so confident of Justice Powell's acquiescence in Justice White's rea
soning, particularly when Powell's separate writing seemed to contradict it?
If White's opinion were treated as a plurality, then Powell's concurrence
would be the law. So why such faith that the White opinion governs?
I. THE CONCURRING CONFUSION
It appears that the answer, remarkably, must lie with a solitary but cru
cial word in Justice Powell's concurrence. It is the fourth word of the
opinion, the one that follows the comma after the Justice's name: "Mr. Jus
10
tice Powell, concurring." If the comma had been followed by one of the
other phrases in the justices' handbag, such as "concurring in part," "concur
ring in the judgment," "concurring in the result," or some combination
thereof, then the panel would have viewed Branzburg quite differently. Had
Justice Powell concurred in part, for example, then the D.C. Circuit would
have admitted that at least some of Justice White's analysis did not have the
support of five votes. Presumably, it would have turned to Justice Powell's
concurrence for further insight.
The Supreme Court itself, moreover, has told us what to do in such a
situation, explaining that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Mem
11
bers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' " This
"narrowest grounds" analysis is the exact approach the reporters were advo
cating to the D.C. Circuit. But, unfortunately for the reporters, Justice
Powell did not select the phrase "concurring in part" to follow the comma
after his name, and he did not pick "concurring in the judgment" either; in
stead he used the simple word "concurring." And therefore, as far as the
D.C. Circuit was concerned, everything he wrote after that word added noth
ing more than "emphasis"--even when it is obvious to many that Justice
12
Powell did not wholly accept Justice White's approach.
This counterintuitive outcome leads me to question whether these la
conic "after the comma" phrases deserve such power-the power to override
even the more detailed analysis that follows in the body of the opinion.
Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Justice White wrote for the
majority and that Justice Powell's concurring opinion "neither limits nor expands upon its holding").

10.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (emphasis added).

11. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)).
12. In all fairness to Judge Sentelle and the D.C. Circuit, the court did go on to state that
even if Justice Powell's opinion allowed for the possibility of a reporter's privilege in some situa
tions, it did not allow for this privilege in the case of a reporter subpoenaed before a grand jury,
which was the situation in the case before it. This decision is likely not a controversial reading of
Branzburg. For my purposes, however, I am simply interested in the logic the court used to dismiss
Justice Powell's concurrence at the forefront of its analysis.
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Should it be that by not concurring "in part," Justice Powell thereby rele
gated all the other words in his opinion to nothing more than judicial
residue? I believe the answer to this question is no.
When it is self-evident that the rationale of the primary opinion does not
hold the support of five justices, it should not be treated as a majority, no
matter how many justices allegedly concurred. Three primary reasons sup
port this conclusion. First, logic dictates that courts should not look the
other way and blindly follow a false majority. Second, the justices do not
use these "after the comma" phrases in a uniform or consistent enough
manner to merit such authority. Finally, the Supreme Court's history of se
riatim opinion writing supports the conclusion that the justices' separate
writings are meant to be dissected and interpreted on an individual basis. In
sum, I disagree with the D.C. Circuit's view that we must damn to legal
oblivion "whatever Justice Powell specifically intended" simply because he
made the choice to "concur" in the majority opinion. Instead, these "after
the comma" phrases should be seen as mere guidelines to the justices' posi
tions but should not be determinative when they conflict with the text of the
opinion.Concurring in name should not trump dissenting in substance.
II. THE CONFUSION CONTINUES
As the Branzburg case demonstrates, courts and commentators are con
fused about the proper interpretation and use of pseudo-concurrences.
Another apt example from the area of media law is found in the 2001 Su
13
preme Court case of Bartnicki v. Vopper. In that case, six members of the
Court held that the First Amendment protected the media defendant's broad
cast of cellular telephone conversations that had been illegally intercepted
and taped by a third party.Justice Stevens authored the opinion of the Court,
and Justices O'Connor and Breyer provided the fifth and sixth votes neces
sary to form a majority. Under the D.C.Circuit's analysis, the story should
end here-the Court had spoken.Yet Justice Breyer filed a separate concur
ring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined. The concurring opinion
begins promisingly enough, as Justice Breyer declares, "I join the Court's
opinion."14 It is in the second sentence where things become fuzzy: "I agree
with its narrow holding limited to the special circumstances present
here.... I write separately to explain why, in my view, the Court's holding
does not imply a significantly broader constitutional immunity for the me,15
d.Ia.,
If accepted as controlling, the text of the Breyer concurrence in Bart
nicki would severely limit the holdings of the "majority" Stevens opinion.
As Professor Smolla observed, "[t]he pivotal concurring opinion of Justice
Breyer was in many respects more in philosophical tune with Chief Justice

13.

532 U.S. 514 (2001).

14.

Id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring).

15.

Id. at 535-36.
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Rehnquist's dissent than with the opinion of Justice Stevens."

16

1955

Therefore,

Professor Smolla concluded that "Justice Stevens's opinion is more aptly
described as a four-Justice plurality decision, a decision that is quite sharply
and dramatically constrained by the limiting language in the Breyer and
17
O'Connor concurrence."
Not surprisingly, there is disagreement about how to interpret Breyer's
"concurring" opinion. One student commentator, for example, adamantly
disagreed with Professor Smolla's analysis, insisting "Bartnicki was not a
plurality decision." In support, he pointed to three elements: the concurring
label, Justice Breyer's opening sentence, and the line-up of justices joining
18
the majority listed in the syllabus. And still other observers are left simply
confused. Another student commentator noted that "[i]t is unknown whether
[future courts] will apply the test applied by the majority in Bartnicki or .. .
19
[the] standard promulgated by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion."
Unfortunately, the Court itself gives us little insight as to which approach is
correct.
III. ANALYZING THE C ONFUSION
In an attempt to discern the proper weight of "after the comma" phrases,
let us begin with the-hopefully not controversial-statement that the prin
cipal job of the Supreme Court is to decide cases by making judgments.
Coming in a strong second is the duty to issue opinions, which "are simply
20
explanations of those judgments or those votes on judgments." While there
is general confidence in the number of justices who support a result, prob
lems arise when trying to determine the number who back a particular
rationale.Many court-watchers might be surprised to notice that opinions of
the Court do not include a "joined by" lineup like those found at the begin
ning of a concurring or dissenting opinion. Rather, public silence by a
21
justice is considered agreement. The flip side is also true--disagreement
requires action, and the official practice is that if a justice differs from the

16.

2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH§ 25:45.50 (2004).

17.

Smolla, supra note 8, at 1114; see also James M. Hilmert, The Supreme Court Takes on
the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and
the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information, 77 IND. L.J. 639, 651-55 (2002) (referring to the
Stevens opinion as a "plurality" and declaring that the limited Breyer concurrence "prevails as the
law of the case").
18. Daniel P. Paradis, Comment, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Cell Phones and T hrowing Stones, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1117, 1147 n.243 (2003).
19.

Jennifer Nichole Hunt, Note, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Another Media Victory or Ominous

Warning of a Potential Change in Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 30 PEPP. L.

REV. 367, 395 (2003).
20. Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 643, 661 (2002). But see Linda Greenhouse, Between Certainty & Doubt: States of Mind on
the Supreme Court Today, 6 GREEN BAG 20 241 (2003) (discussing the doctrinal debate between
judicial "minimalists," who decide cases, and judicial "maximalists," who lay down legal rules).
21. Although the current practice is for justices to send non-public "join" letters to the author
of an opinion of the Court, the justices make no public statement of agreement.

1956

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:1951

reasoning of the primary opinion, he or she must file or openly join a sepa
rate opinion. The reader is left to sort out the fragments.
This system works relatively well with dissenting opinions. A dissent
tends to be a clear signal that this is one justice who is not on board with
whatever scheme his or her brethren are concocting. Things become murky,
however, when a justice concurs at least to some degree with the opinion of
the Court and chooses to write separately. In a system in which silence
equals agreement, a justice's mere act of writing separately signals to the
reader that closer inspection is needed to fully understand the justice's posi
tion. Assuming that a separate writing indicates some amount of divergence
from the majority opinion, whether greatly in substance or minimally in
emphasis, the reader must then search for further clues to determine the ex
tent of the justice's departure. Obviously a first step is the phrase following
the comma after the justice's name: "concurring," "concurring in part,"
"concurring in the judgment," "concurring in the result," or some medley of
the above. But is that the only meaningful indicator?
The student commentator I mentioned above also relied on the syllabus
as evidence that Justices Breyer and O'Connor were fully concurring in the
majority opinion in Bartnicki. Yet the practice of cataloging in the syllabus
which justices have fully joined the opinion of the Court began only recently
in the 1970s. In Bartnicki there was such a list, but in more cases-such as
in Branzbu rg--even the Reporter of Decisions had no comment. Of course,
each Supreme Court decision reminds the audience that the syllabus "consti
tutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the
22
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader." The point of this
disclaimer is that the reader should discern the position of the justice based
on the text of the opinion, not on the summaries. The question remains,
therefore, whether the "after the comma" phrases should play a heightened
precedential role or, like the syllabus, they should be seen as mere guide
lines offered for the convenience of the reader that should not override the
official analysis that follows.
One important difference between the syllabus and the "after the
comma" phrases is that the phrases are added by the justice's chambers as
part of the drafting process and not by the Reporter of Decisions. A very
23
informal conversation with former Supreme Court law clerks revealed that
in most chambers the phrase is selected by the justice preparing the first
24

draft or, as often, by the hapless law clerk to whom the task was assigned.

22. See. e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1754 n.* (2001) (citing United States v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906)).
23. The informal conversation involved my emailing or talking in person with a handful o�
clerks with whom I am acquainted from a variety of terms and chambers.
24. See B. Rudolph Delson, Note, Typography in the U.S. Repons and Supreme Coun Voting
Protocols, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1203, 1209 n.34 (2001) ("Even if clerks were not composing opinions
in their entirety, they might have been instrumental in determining how opinions were formatted.");
see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I
confess that I have not personally investigated the entire legislative history--or even that portion of
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While some clerks recalled an occasional discussion about the proper termi
nology, many did not. Could it be that the fate of the reporter's privilege
could have taken a different tum had a law clerk thought to say, "Justice
Powell, do you think you should add in part after the word concurring?"
While blaming the clerks and writing off "after the comma" phrases as
slapdash add-ons might be a simple way to resolve this question in some
cases, it is ultimately unsatisfactory. Contrary to Oliver Wendell Holmes's
25
declaration that judges "are apt to be naif, simple-minded men," it seems
more plausible that Justice Powell purposefully chose to put concurring
after the comma in lieu of another phrase. Commentators of political science
research on judicial decisionmaking and strategy have observed that "there
26
is clearly a norm in favor of reaching a majority opinion." In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc.

v. FCC for example, Justice Stevens in his opin
,
ion "concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" stated plainly that

he was voting the opposite of his inclinations because "no disposition of this
27
appeal would command the support of a majority of the Court." Some jus
tices view plurality opinions as a failure on the part of the Court to fulfill its
28
duty to decide cases. As Professor Thomas Baker observed, the justices
have "not infrequently sublimated their judicial egos, suppressed their indi
vidual voices, [and] voted against themselves ... in particular cases, out of
29
respect for the Court as an institution."
The desire for the Court to have a majority opinion, at least in name if
not in reasoning, would likely have resonated with no one more so than Jus
30
tice Powell, nicknamed "the majority maker."
If unity were Justice

it which relates to the four statutes listed above. The excerpts I have examined and quoted were
unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task.").
25.
(1920).

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295

26. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 549 (1998) (reviewing LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) and citing Saul Brenner & Robert
H. Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and F luidity Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Theo
retical Perspective, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 195, 198-200 (1992) (reporting that justices shift from
the minority to the majority in order to create a greater Court consensus)).
27. 512 U.S. 622, 669, 674 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
28. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (suggesting that when the
Court is "splintered," there is "a reason for reexamining that decision"); BoB WOODWARD & Scorr
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 58 (1979) (stating that Chief Justice Burger believed that "concur
rences detracted from the main opinion and were, in some cases, almost an insult to the author
assigned for the majority"); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 52-53 (1993) (declaring it the "norm for
judges to sacrifice details of their convictions in the service of producing an outcome and opinion
attributable to the court").
29. Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court "Supreme, " 4 GREEN BAG 2D 129,
136 (2001).
30. Former Supreme Court Justice Powell Dead At 90, CNN.COM, Aug. 25, 1998,
http://www.cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/25/obit.powell/; see also Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis
F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1855-86 (1995) (book re
view) (stating that Justice Powell's "perception of himself as a centrist led him to believe that the
law must be what he thought it was" and describing his opinions as a "mosaic of accommodation,
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Powell's main motivation in choosing to concur outright, however, it is un
certain whether he did so knowing the risk that it would devalue his separate
writing or believing his choice would increase the importance of his concur
rence by positioning it to shape future interpretations of the opinion of the
Court. Either way, it is unpersuasive to argue that this type of gamesmanship
and tactical maneuvering should override the actual legal analysis of a jus
tice when it is made available to us via a separate opinion.
All of these questions must be examined, moreover, in the context of the
uses of these phrases over time from case to case, justice to justice, and
Court to Court. Even a cursory review of Supreme Court jurisprudence
shows that there is little consistency. For example, both Justice Powell and
Justice Breyer have shown they can and will concur "in part" or "in the
judgment" in other cases in which their disagreement with the majority
31
seems no more pronounced than in Branzburg and Bartnicki. It is further
not clear whether urging the justices to be more thoughtful with their "after
the comma" phrasing would lead to any greater clarity. How much is the law
aided by knowing that Justice Blackmun was "concurring in part, concur
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part" in his separate opinion
32
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey? What could this type of Uber-detailed
description mean other than simply, "Read the opinion to see what I think"?
'
IV. THE COURT S HISTORY CLEARS THE C ONFUSION

This examination of these "after the comma" phrases thus far has re
vealed that they are used in an inconsistent, unclear, and often contradictory
manner. This leaves little to instill confidence that these phrases should take
prominence over the text of the separate writing when there is a conflict.
Some might argue, therefore, that the inquiry should end here with the con
clusion that judicial precedent includes at its core nothing more than
judgments, and to the extent opinion-writing goes beyond the judgment, it
is, in actuality, simply dicta. I do not believe it is necessary to be quite so
dismissive of the explanations of judgments found in Court opinions.
Rather, I believe the answer lies with a look at the history of opinion-writing
by the Court.
Originally, the Supreme Court issued opinions through anonymously
written per curiam opinions or by the justices writing seriatim (separately)

highly differentiated and strongly variegated but of a generally conservative hue" (quoting JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 403 (1994))).
31. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 127 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part) ("I agree with the Court's conclusion and join its opinion to the extent that they
are consistent with the following three observations."); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I write to emphasize [this case's] uniqueness, and
the consequent limited precedential effect of much of the Court's opinion.").
32. 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part) see also, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 606 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part).
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33
in every case. It was Chief Justice Marshall who first began the tradition of
34
having one justice author an opinion of the Court. The practice was not
universally embraced. Denouncing this new approach to opinion writing,
Thomas Jefferson declared it "convenient for the lazy, the modest, & the
35
incompetent." Jefferson, instead, called for a return to the seriatim style of
opinion delivery, arguing that only separate writings give "our citizens one
and all, that confidence in their judges which must be so desirable to the
36
judges themselves, and so important to the cement of the union."
The first concurrence to an opinion of the Court was in the Marshall-era
31
v. Irvine.
Even though Chief Justice Ellsworth had delivered

case of Sims

the opinion of the Court, Justice Iredell wrote separately, explaining,
"(t]hough I concur with the other judges of the court in affirming the judg
ment of the circuit court, yet as I differ from them in the reasons for
38
affirmance, I think it proper to state my opinion particularly." Some mem
bers of the Court later concluded that separate opinions were essential to the
workings of the Court and it was their duty to explain their individual rea
soning "on all subjects of general interest;
,,39
questtons.

particularly

constitutional

•

While Chief Justice Marshall's tradition of opinions of the Court au
thored by individual justices remains, the current practice of separate
writings clearly emanates from our seriatim past. English courts still follow
this approach, in which "[e]ach judge delivers an opinion separately, some
times extempore, so that one can determine the views of the court only by
40
adding up these individual statements." The value and desirability of sepa
rate writings endure because they tend to be more intellectually honest and
41

give the public confidence in the exact analysis of the individual justices.

Separate writings by the justices also serve "an important and legitimate role
42
In other words,

in distinguishing between strong and weak precedents."

tradition demanded separate, individual analysis of each case by our jurists.
So in cases in which the newer "opinion of the Court" system clearly fails,

33. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 140 (1999).
34.

Id. at 143.

35.

Id. at 145.

36.

Id. at 146.

37.

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 424 (1799); Kelsch, supra note 33, at 142.

38.

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 457.

39.

Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. II, 1823), quoted in Kelsh,

supra note 33, at 149.

40.

John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 489 (2001).
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as in Branzburg, it makes sense to revert to a justice-by-justice approach in
determining what the law is.
To be clear, I do not argue that lower courts cannot rely on an opinion of
the Court in which five or more justices wholly concur. Similarly, there is no
question that whether a justice concurs or dissents is a reliable indicator of
his or her vote on the outcome of the particular case before the Court. It is
only in the cases in which a necessary member of the "majority" writes an
opinion that in substance diverges from the reasoning of the Court that I
contend we must view it as what it truly is-a return to our seriatim roots.
We should, in these instances, engage in the more difficult and time
consurning practice of opinion-by-opinion analysis and face the vague, un
predictable consequences that flow from it. This, I believe, is the messy
beauty of the law. And in this conclusion I hope others will concur-well, at
least in part anyway.

